Off-policy Policy Evaluation For Sequential Decisions Under Unobserved
  Confounding by Namkoong, Hongseok et al.
Off-policy Policy Evaluation For Sequential Decisions
Under Unobserved Confounding
Hongseok Namkoong * Ramtin Keramati * 1 Steve Yadlowsky * 1 Emma Brunskill 1
Abstract
When observed decisions depend only on ob-
served features, off-policy policy evaluation
(OPE) methods for sequential decision making
problems can estimate the performance of evalua-
tion policies before deploying them. This assump-
tion is frequently violated due to unobserved con-
founders, unrecorded variables that impact both
the decisions and their outcomes. We assess ro-
bustness of OPE methods under unobserved con-
founding by developing worst-case bounds on the
performance of an evaluation policy. When unob-
served confounders can affect every decision in an
episode, we demonstrate that even small amounts
of per-decision confounding can heavily bias OPE
methods. Fortunately, in a number of important
settings found in healthcare, policy-making, oper-
ations, and technology, unobserved confounders
may primarily affect only one of the many deci-
sions made. Under this less pessimistic model
of one-decision confounding, we propose an effi-
cient loss-minimization-based procedure for com-
puting worst-case bounds, and prove its statis-
tical consistency. On two simulated healthcare
examples—management of sepsis patients and
developmental interventions for autistic children—
where this is a reasonable model of confounding,
we demonstrate that our method invalidates non-
robust results and provides meaningful certificates
of robustness, allowing reliable selection of poli-
cies even under unobserved confounding.
1. Introduction
New technology and regulatory shifts allow the collection of
an unprecedented amount of data on past decisions and their
associated outcomes, ranging from product recommenda-
tion systems to medical treatment decisions. This presents
unique opportunities for using off-policy observational data
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to inform better decision-making. When online experimen-
tation is expensive or risky, it is crucial to leverage prior
data to evaluate the performance of a sequential decision
policy (which we call the evaluation policy) before deploy-
ing it. The dynamic treatment regime literature (Robins,
1986; 1997; Murphy, 2003) addressed many early ques-
tions around using observational data for sequential deci-
sion making, and developed a rich set of methods adapted
for epidemiological questions. The reinforcement learning
(RL) community is increasingly interested in developing
theory and methods for the related problem of batch RL
across a broad set of applications, because of new models
and data availability (see e.g. Thomas et al. (2019); Liu
et al. (2018b); Le et al. (2019); Thomas et al. (2015); Ko-
morowski et al. (2018b); Hanna et al. (2017); Gottesman
et al. (2019b;c)). We focus on performing off-policy policy
evaluation (OPE) in the common scenario where decisions
are made in episodes by an unknown behavior policy, each
involving a sequence of decisions.
A central challenge in OPE is that the estimand is inher-
ently a counterfactual quantity: what would the resulting
outcomes be if an alternate policy had been used (the coun-
terfactual) instead of the behavior policy that generated
the observed data (the factual). As a result, OPE requires
causal reasoning about whether observed high/low rewards
were caused by observed decisions, as opposed to a com-
mon causal variable that simultaneously affects both the
observed decisions and the states or rewards (Herna´n and
Robins, 2020; Pearl, 2009). In order to make counterfactual
evaluations possible, a standard assumption—albeit often
overlooked and unstated—is to require that the behavior
policy does not depend on any unobserved/latent variables
that also affect the future states or rewards (no unobserved
confounding). We refer to this assumption as sequential
ignorability, following the line of works on dynamic treat-
ment regimes (Robins, 1986; 1997; Murphy et al., 2001;
Murphy, 2003).
Sequential ignorability, however, is almost always violated
in observational problems where the behavior policy is un-
known. In healthcare, business operations, and some au-
tomated systems in tech, decisions depend on unlogged
features correlated with future outcomes. Clinicians use
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visual observations or discussions with patients to inform
treatment decisions, but such information is typically not
quantified and coded in electronic medical records; they
also rely on heuristics that are fundamentally difficult to
quantify, tending to over-extrapolate on past experience and
slow to correct mistakes (McDonald, 1996). In judicial
decisions, psychological factors affect bail and parole de-
cisions (Dhami, 2003; Danziger et al., 2011). In business
contexts, simple heuristics are prevalent; concrete examples
include venture capital investments (A˚stebro and Elhedhli,
2006), and customer targeting (Wu¨bben and Wangenheim,
2008). Even automated policies in tech firms depend on
unlogged features (Agarwal et al., 2016), and complex soft-
ware and data infrastructures often introduce confounding.
In this paper, we study a framework for quantifying the im-
pact of unobserved confounders on OPE estimates, develop-
ing worst-case bounds on the performance of an evaluation
policy. Since OPE is generally impossible under arbitrary
unobserved confounding, we begin by positing a model that
explicitly limits their influence on decisions. Our proposed
model is a natural extension of an influential confounding
model for a single binary decision (Rosenbaum, 2002) to
the multi-action sequential decision making setting. When
unobserved confounders can affect all decisions, even small
amounts of confounding can have an exponential (in the
number of decisions) impact on the bias of OPE as we il-
lustrate in Section 4. In this sense, the validity of OPE can
almost always be questioned under presence of unobserved
confounding that affect all decisions.
Fortunately, in a number of important applications, unob-
served confounders may only affect a single decision. Fre-
quently, this happens when a high-level expert decision-
makers make an initial decision potentially using unrecorded
information, after which a standard set of protocols are fol-
lowed based on well-recorded observations. Under our less
pessimistic model of single-decision confounding, we de-
velop bounds on the expected cumulative rewards under the
evaluation policy (Section 5). We use functional convex
duality to derive a dual relaxation, and show that it can be
computed by solving a loss minimization problem. Our
procedure allows analyzing sensitivity of OPE methods to
confounding in realistic scenarios involving continuous state
and rewards, over a potentially large horizon. We prove that
an empirical approximation of our procedure is consistent,
allowing estimation from observed past decisions. Our loss
minimization approach builds on the single decision work
by Yadlowsky et al. (2018), and extends it to sequential
decision-making scenarios.
On examples of dynamic treatment regimes for autism and
sepsis management, we illustrate how our single-decision
confounding model allows informative bounds over mean-
ingful amounts of confounding. Our approach provides
certificates of robustness by identifying the level of unob-
served confounding at which the bias in OPE estimates
can raise concerns about the validity of selecting the best
policy among a set of candidates. As we illustrate, develop-
ing tools for a meaningful sensitivity analysis is nontrivial:
a naive bound yields prohibitively conservative estimates
that almost lose robustness certificates for even neglible
amounts of confounding, whereas our loss-minimization-
based bounds on policy values is informative.
1.1. Motivating example: managing sepsis patients
Sepsis in ICU patients accounts for 1/3 of deaths in hospi-
tals (Howell and Davis, 2017). Sepsis treatment decisions
are made by a clinical care team, including nurses, residents,
and ICU attending physicians and specialists (Rhodes et al.,
2017). Difficulties of care often lead to making decisions
based off of imperfect information, leading to substantial
room for improvement. AI-based approaches provide an
opportunity for optimal automated management of medi-
cations, freeing the care team to allocate more resources
to critical cases. Automated approaches can manage im-
portant medications for sepsis, including antibiotics and
vasopressors, and decide to notify the care team about when
a patient should be placed on a mechanical ventilator. Mo-
tivated by these opportunities, and the availability of ICU
data from MIMIC-III (Johnson et al., 2016), several AI-
based approaches for sepsis management system have been
proposed (Futoma et al., 2018; Komorowski et al., 2018a;
Raghu et al., 2017).
Due to safety concerns, new treatment policies need to
be evaluated offline before thorough online clinical vali-
dation. Confounding, however, is a serious issue in data
generated from an ICU. Patients in emergency departments
often do not have an existing record in the hospital’s elec-
tronic health system, leaving a substantial amount of patient-
specific information unobserved in subsequent offline anal-
ysis. As a prominent example, comorbidities that signifi-
cantly complicate the cases of sepsis (Brent, 2017) are often
unrecorded. Private communication with an emergency
department physician revealed that initial treatment of an-
tibiotics at admission to the hospital are often confounded by
unrecorded factors that affect the eventual outcome (death
or discharge from the ICU). For example, comorbidities
such as undiagnosed heart failure can delay diagnosis of
sepsis, leading to slower implementation of antibiotic treat-
ments. More generally, there is considerable discussion in
the medical literature on the importance of quickly begin-
ning antibiotic treatment, with frequently noted concerns
about confounding, as these discussions are largely based on
off-policy observational data collected from ICUs (Seymour
et al., 2017; Sterling et al., 2015). Given the recent interest
in balancing early treatment with risks of over-prescription,
treatment regimes for antibiotics are of particular interest.
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We consider a scenario where one wishes to evaluate be-
tween two automated policies that differ only in initially
avoiding, or prescribing antibiotics, and otherwise acts op-
timally. The latter is often considered a better treatment
for sepsis, as it is caused by an infection. In this example,
unobserved factors most critically effect the first decision
on prescribing antibiotics upon arrival; since the care team
is highly trained for treating sepsis, we assume they follow
standard protocols based on observed vitals signs and lab
measurements in subsequent time steps. In what follows, we
assess the impact of confounding factors discussed above
on OPE of automated policies, and provide certificates of
robustness that guarantee gains over existing policies.
2. Related Work
The majority of OPE methods for batch reinforcement learn-
ing rely on sequential ignorability (though often unstated).
There is an extensive body of work for off-policy policy
evaluation and optimization under this assumption, includ-
ing doubly robust methods (Jiang and Li, 2015; Thomas and
Brunskill, 2016) and recent work that provides semipara-
metric efficiency bounds (Kallus and Uehara, 2019); often
the behavior policy (conditional distribution of decisions
given states) is assumed to be known. Notably, Liu et al.
(2018b) highlights how estimation error in the behavioral
policy can bias value estimates, and Nie et al. (2019); Hanna
et al. (2019) provides OPE estimators based on an estimator
of the behavior policy. When sequential ignorability doesn’t
hold, the expected cumulative rewards under an evaluation
policy cannot be identified from observable data. All of the
above estimators are biased in the presence of unobserved
confounding, since neither the outcome model nor the im-
portance sampling weights can correct for the effect of the
unobserved confounder.
The do-calculus and its sequential backdoor criterion on the
associated directed acyclic graph (Pearl, 2009) also gives
identification results for OPE. Like sequential ignorabil-
ity, this preclude the existence of unobserved confounding
variables. Therefore, methods that assume the sequential
backdoor criterion will be biased in their presence.
We study the effects of unobserved confounding on OPE in
sequential decision making problems, deriving bounds on
the performance of the evaluation policy when sequential ig-
norability is relaxed. For problems where only one decision
is made, a variety of methods developed in the econometrics,
statistics, and epidemiology literature estimate bounds on
treatment effects and expected rewards. Manski (1990) de-
veloped bounds that only assume bounded rewards, though
they are too conservative to identify whether one action is
superior to another. Then, Manski (1990) and other works
posit models that bound the effect of unobserved confound-
ing on the outcome (Robins et al., 2000; Brumback et al.,
2004), or—like ours—on the actions taken by the behavior
policy (Cornfield et al., 1959; Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983;
Imbens, 2003). Recent work studied approaches that can
apply to heterogeneous treatment effects (Yadlowsky et al.,
2018; Kallus et al., 2018), policy evaluation (Jung et al.,
2018), and policy optimization (Kallus and Zhou, 2018).
In sequential decision making settings, Zhang and Barein-
boim (2019) derived partial identification bounds on policy
performance with limited restrictions on the influence of the
unobserved confounder on observed decisions, much like
the single decision work of Manski (1990), which they use
to guide online RL algorithms. Unfortunately, these bounds
are quite conservative for use only in OPE. Robins et al.
(2000); Robins (2004); Brumback et al. (2004) instead posit
a model for how the confounding bias in each time step
affects the outcome of interest and derive bounds under this
model: their work is motivated by potential confounding in
the effects of dynamic treatment regimes for HIV therapy
on CD4 counts in HIV-positive men. Our work is comple-
mentary to these in that we instead assume a model for how
the unobserved confounder affects the actions taken by the
behavior policy.
3. Formulation
Notation conventions vary substantially in the diverse set of
communities interested in learning from (sequential) obser-
vational data. In this paper, we use the potential outcomes
notation to make explicit which sequence of actions we wish
to evaluate versus which sequence of actions were actually
observed. In this approach, we posit all potential states
and rewards exist for each possible sequence of actions, but
we only observe the one corresponding to the actions taken
(also known as partial, or bandit feedback), making the other
potential states and rewards counterfactual. Literature in
batch off policy reinforcement learning almost always as-
sumes sequential ignorability, in which case the distribution
of potential states and rewards are independent of the action
taken by the behavior policy, conditional on the observed
history. This allows us to consistently estimate counterfactu-
als simply based on observed outcomes. However, since our
aim is to consider the impact of hypothetized confounding,
clarifying the difference between the potential and observed
states and rewards is cumbersome, but important.
We focus on domains modeled by episodic stochastic de-
cision processes with a discrete set of actions. Let At be
a finite action set of actions available at time t = 1, .., T .
Denote a sequence of actions a1 ∈ A1, .., aT ∈ AT by
a1:T (and similarly at:t′ for arbitrary indices 1 ≤ t ≤
t′ ≤ T , with the convention a1:0 = ∅). For any se-
quence of actions a1:T , let St(a1:t−1) and Rt(a1:t) be
the state and reward at time t. A state can be a scalar
or a vector of discrete- or continuous-valued features; in
Off-policy Policy Evaluation Under Unobserved Confounding
our experimental settings we consider continuous-valued
states. Y (a1:T ) :=
∑T
t=1 γ
t−1Rt(a1:t) is the correspond-
ing discounted sum of rewards. We denote by W (a1:T ) =
(S1, .., ST (a1:T−1), R1(a1), .., RT (a1:T )) all potential out-
comes (over rewards and states) associated with the action
sequence a1:T . Any sum
∑
a1:t
over action sequences is
taken over all a1:T ∈ A1 × · · · × AT .
In the off-policy setting, we observe sequences of ac-
tions A1, .., AT generated by an unknown behavior pol-
icy pi1, .., piT . Let Ht denote the observed history un-
til time t, so that H1 := S1, and for t = 2, .., T ,
Ht := (S1, A1, S2(A1), A2, .., St(A1:t−1)). As a nota-
tional shorthand, for any fixed sequence of actions a1:T ,
denote an instantiation of the observed history following
the action sequence by Ht(a1:t−1), so that H1(a1:0) :=
H1 = S1, and for t = 2, .., T , Ht(a1:t−1) = (S1, A1 =
a1, S2(a1), .., At−1 = at−1, St(a1:t−1)). LetHt be the set
over which this history takes values.
When there is no unobserved confounding, At ∼ pit(· | Ht)
since actions are generated conditional on the observed his-
tory Ht. When there is unobserved confounding Ut, the
behavioral policy draws actions At ∼ pit(· | Ht, Ut), and
we denote by pit(· | Ht) the conditional distribution of At
given only the observed history Ht, meaning we marginal-
ize out the unobserved confounder Ut. For simplicity, we
assume that previously observed rewards are included in the
states, so for s < t, Rs(A1:s) is known given Ht the history.
We define Yt(at) := Y (A1:t−1, at, At+1:T ) as a shorthand:
semantically this means the sum of rewards which matches
a trajectory of executed actions on all but one action, where
on time step t action at is taken. Note that since at may not
be identical to the taken action At, the resulting expression
for Y represents a potential outcome.
Our goal is to bound the performance of an evaluation pol-
icy p¯i1, .., p¯iT in a confounded sequential off-policy envi-
ronment. Let A¯t ∼ p¯it(· | H¯t) be the actions generated
by the evaluation policy at time t, where we use H¯t :=
(S1, A¯1, S2(A¯1), A¯2, .., St(A¯1:t−1)) and H¯t(a1:t−1) :=
(S1, A¯1 = a1, S2(a1), A¯2 = a2, .., St(a1:t−1)) to denote
the history under the evaluation policy, analogously to the
shorthandsHt, Ht(a1:t−1); H¯t are mathematical constructs,
as they are never observed in the behavioral data. We are
interested in statistical estimation of the expected cumula-
tive reward E[Y (A¯1:T )] under the evaluation policy, which
we call the performance of the evaluation policy (aka V p¯i in
batch RL). Throughout, we assume pit(at | Ht) > 0 when-
ever p¯it(at | H¯t) > 0, for all t and at, and almost every Ht,:
in other words, overlap holds with respect to the conditional
distributions over actions given only the histories between
the behavior policy and the evaluation policy.
We now state the sequential ignorability assumption in terms
of the relationship between actions and potential outcomes
(see e.g (Robins, 1986; 2004; Murphy, 2003)).
Definition 1 (Sequential Ignorability). We say that a policy
satisfies sequential ignorability if for all t = 1, .., T , condi-
tional on the history generated by the policy, the action gen-
erated by the policy is independent of the potential outcomes
Rt(a1:t), St+1(a1:t), Rt+1(a1:t+1), St+2(a1:t+1), ..,
ST (a1:T−1), RT (a1:T ) for all a1:T ∈ A1 × · · ·AT .
Sequential ignorability is a natural condition required for
the evaluation policy to be well-defined: any additional
randomization used by the evaluation policy p¯it(· | H¯t)
cannot depend on unobserved confounders. We assume that
the evaluation policy always satisfies this assumption.
Assumption A. The evaluation policy satisfies sequential
ignorability (Definition 1).
Off-policy policy evaluation fundamentally requires coun-
terfactual reasoning since we only observe the state evo-
lution St(A1:t−1) and rewards Rt(A1:t) corresponding to
the actions made by the behavioral policy. The canonical
assumption in batch off-policy reinforcement learning is
that sequential ignorability holds for the behavior policy.
We now briefly review how this allows identification (and
thus, accurate estimation) of E[Y (A¯1:T )], the value of the
evaluation policy.
Because we only observe potential outcomes W (A1:t) eval-
uated at the actions A1:t taken by the behavior policy pit,
we need to express E[Y (A¯1:T )] in terms of observable data
generated by the behavioral policy pit. Sequential ignorabil-
ity of both the behavior policy and evaluation policy allows
such counterfactual reasoning. The following identity is
standard; we give its proof in Section B.1 for completeness.
To ease notation, we write
ρt :=
p¯it(At | H¯t(A1:t−1))
pit(At | Ht) . (1)
Lemma 1. Assume sequential ignorability (Definition 1)
holds for both the behavior and evaluation policy. Then,
E[Y (A¯1:T )] = E[Y (A1:T )
∏T
t=1 ρt].
The RHS is called the importance sampling formula.
4. Bounds under unobserved confounding
Despite the advantageous implications, it is often unrealistic
to assume that the behavior policy pit satisfies sequential
ignorability (Definition 1). We now relax the sequential ig-
norability of the behavior policy, and instead posit a model
of bounded confounding for the behavior policy, then de-
velop worst-case bounds on the evaluation policy perfor-
mance E[Y (A¯1:T )] under this model. In addition to the
observed state St(A1:t−1) available in the data, we assume
that there is an unobserved confounder Ut available only
to the behavior policy at each time t. The behavior policy
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observes the history Ht and the unobserved confounder Ut,
and generates an action At ∼ pit(· | Ht, Ut). If Ut con-
tains information about unseen potential outcomes, then
sequential ignorability (Definition 1) will fail to hold for the
behavior policy.
Without loss of generality, let Ut be such that the potential
outcomes are independent of At when controlling for Ut
alongside the observed states. Such an unobserved con-
founder always exists since we can define Ut to be the tuple
of all unseen potential outcomes.
Assumption B. For all t = 1, .., T , there exists a
random vector Ut such that conditional on the history
Ht generated by the behavior policy and Ut, At ∼
pit(· | Ht, Ut) is independent of the potential outcomes
Rt(a1:t), St+1(a1:t), Rt+1(a1:t+1), St+2(a1:t+1), ..,
ST (a1:T−1), RT (a1:T ) for all a1:T ∈ A1 × · · ·AT .
Identification of E[Y (A¯1:T )] is impossible under arbitrary
unobserved confounding. However, it is often plausible
to posit that the unobserved confounder Ut has a limited
influence on the decisions of the behavior policy. When
the influence of unobserved confounding on each action
is limited, we may expect OPE estimates that (incorrectly)
assume sequential ignorability may not be too biased.
Consider the following model of unobserved confounding
for sequential decision making problems, which bounds
confounder’s influence on the behavior policy’s decisions.
Assumption C. For t = 1, .., T , there is a Γt ≥ 1 satisfying
pit(at | Ht, Ut = ut)
pit(a′t | Ht, Ut = ut)
pit(a
′
t | Ht, Ut = u′t)
pit(at | Ht, Ut = u′t)
≤ Γt (2)
for any at, a′t ∈ At, almost surely over Ht, and ut, u′t, and
sequential ignorability holds conditional on Ht and Ut.
Our bounded unobserved confounding assumption (2) is a
natural extension of a classical model of confounding pro-
posed by Rosenbaum (2002) for a single decision (T = 1) to
sequential problems. When the action space is binary At =
{0, 1}, the above bounded unobserved confounding assump-
tion is equivalent (Rosenbaum, 2002) to the following logis-
tic model log P(At=1|Ht,Ut)P(At=0|Ht,Ut) = κ(Ht) + (log Γt) · b(Ut) for
some measurable function κ(·) and a bounded measurable
function b(·) taking values in [0, 1].
In the sequential setting where T > 1, OPE is almost always
unreliable even under the aformentioned model. Effects of
confounding can create exponentially large (in the horizon
T ) over-sampling of large (or small) rewards, introducing
an extremely large, un-correctable bias. As an illustration,
consider applying OPE in the following simplified setting,
where there are no states. Let U ∼ Unif({0, 1}) be a single
unobserved confounder, and consider the sequence of behav-
ioral actionsA1, . . . , AT ∈ {0, 1} each drawn conditionally
on U , but independent of one another, with the conditional
distribution P (At = 1 | U = 1) =
√
Γ/(1 +
√
Γ) and
P (At = 1 | U = 0) = 1/(1 +
√
Γ). Let the outcome be
Y (a1:T ) = U for all possible action sequences a1:T . Al-
though the actions do not affect the outcome, in the observed
data the likelihood of observing ((At = 1)Tt=1, Y = 1) is
ΓT/2/(2(1 +
√
Γ)T ), whereas the likelihood of observing
((At = 1)
T
t=1, Y = 0) is 1/(2(1 +
√
Γ)T ). Therefore, even
in the limit of infinite observations, OPE will mistakenly
estimate that always taking A¯t = 1 leads to better rewards
than always taking A¯t = 0.
Even in this toy example example where states don’t exist
and rewards don’t depend on actions, the effect of con-
founding is salient. The unobserved confounder can make
certain observed data samples exponentially more likely
than others, without the OPE algorithm being able to tell or
correct for these differences. This has important implica-
tions for off-policy policy selection or optimization, where
such systematic differences can lead to selection of a poorly
performing policy.
5. Confounding in a single decision
In many important applications, it is realistic to assume there
is only a single step of confounding at a known time step
t∗. Under this assumption, we outline in this section how
we obtain a computationally and statistically feasible proce-
dure for computing a lower (or upper) bound on the value
E[Y (A¯1:T )] of an evaluation policy p¯i. After introducing
precisely our model of confounding, we show in Proposi-
tion 1 how the evaluation policy value can be expressed
using likelihood ratios over potential outcomes that can be
used to relate the potential outcomes over observed (fac-
tual) actions with counterfactual actions not taken. These
likelihood ratios over potential outcomes are unobserved,
but a lower bound on the evaluation policy value can be
computed by minimizing over all feasible likelihood ratios
that satisfy our model of bounded confounding. Towards
computational tractability, we derive a dual relaxation that
can be represented as a loss minimization procedure.
We define the confounding model for when there is an unob-
served confounding variable U that only affects the behavior
policy’s action at a single time period t? ∈ [T ]. For example,
in looking at the impact of confounders on antibiotics in sep-
sis management (Section 1.1), it is plausible to assume that
while confounders may influence the first decision when the
patient arrives, later treatment decisions are not impacted
by unobserved confounders.
Assumption D. For all t 6= t?, conditional on
the history Ht generated by the behavior pol-
icy, At is independent of the potential outcomes
Rt(a1:t), St+1(a1:t), Rt+1(a1:t+1), St+2(a1:t+1), ..,
ST (a1:T−1), RT (a1:T ) for all a1:T ∈ A1 × · · ·AT . For
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t = t?, there exists a random variable U such that the same
conditional independence holds only when conditional on
the history Ht and U .
Similar to Assumption C, but now restricted to a single time
step t∗, we assume the unobserved confounder has bounded
influence on the behavior policy’s action At? .
Assumption E. There is a Γ ≥ 1 satisfying
pit?(at? | Ht? , U = u)
pit?(a′t? | Ht? , U = u)
pit?(a
′
t? | Ht? , U = u′)
pit?(at? | Ht? , U = u′) ≤ Γ (3)
for any at? , a′t? ∈ At? , almost surely over Ht? , and u, u′.
Selecting the amount of unobserved confounding Γ is a
modeling task, and the above confounding model’s simplic-
ity and interpretability makes it advantageous for enabling
modelers to choose a plausible value of Γ. As in any applied
modeling problem, the amount of unobserved confounding
Γ should be chosen with expert knowledge (e.g. by consult-
ing doctors that make behavioral decisions). In Section 6,
we give various application contexts in which a realistic
range of Γ can be posited. One of the most interpretable
ways to assess the level of robustness to confounding is via
the design sensitivity of the analysis (Rosenbaum, 2010):
the value of Γ at which the bounds on the evaluation policy’s
value crosses a landmark threshold (e.g. performance of
behavior policy or some known safety threshold).
We first show that a simple naı¨ve lower bound on the eval-
uation policy performance E[Y (A¯1:T )] can be obtained by
directly applying our bounded confounding model (3) to
adjust the weights of an importance sampling estimator.
Details are provided in Section C.1.
Lemma 2. Let Assumptions A, D, E hold. Then, we have
E[Y (A¯1:T )] ≥ E
[
Y (A1:T )×
T∏
t=1
ρt (4)
× (Γ1 {Y (A1:T ) < 0}+ Γ−11 {Y (A1:T ) > 0}) ].
However, the naive bound (4) is often prohibitively conser-
vative, as we concretely illustrate in Section 6.
Instead we derive a tighter bound on the evaluation policy
performance E[Y (A¯1:T )] based on a constrained convex
optimization formulation over counterfactual distributions.
Under Assumption E, the likelihood ratio between observed
and unobserved distribution at t? can at most vary by a
factor of Γ. Recall that W (a1:T ) is the tuple of all potential
outcomes associated with the actions a1:T . The following
observation is due to Yadlowsky et al. (2018, Lemma 2.1).
Lemma 3. Under Assumptions D, E, for all at? 6= a′t? ,
the likelihood ratio over the tuple of potential outcomes
W := {W (a1:T )}a1:T exists
L(·;Ht? , at? , a′t?) :=
dPW (· | Ht? , At? = a′t?)
dPW (· | Ht? , At? = at?) ,
and for PW (· | Ht? , At? = at?)-a.s. all w,w′
L(w;Ht? , at? , a′t?) ≤ ΓL(w′;Ht? , at? , a′t?). (5)
We let L(·;Ht? , at? , at?) ≡ 1. Using these (unknown)
likelihood ratios, we can express the value of the evaluation
policy, E[Y (A¯1:T )].
Proposition 1. Under Assumptions A, D, E,
E[Y (A¯1:T )]
= E
[
t?−1∏
t=1
ρt
∑
at? ,a
′
t?
p¯it?(at? | H¯t?(A1:t?−1))pit?(at? | Ht?)
× E
[
L(W ;Ht? , at? , a′t?)Y (A1:T )
T∏
t=t?+1
ρt
∣∣∣Ht? , At? = at?]].
The proof is given in Section B.2.
Proposition 1 implies a natural bound on the evaluation
policy value E[Y (A¯1:T )] under bounded unobserved con-
founding. Since the likelihood ratios L(·; ·, at? , a′t?) are
fundamentally unobservable due to their counterfactual na-
ture, we take a worst-case approach over all likelihood ratios
that satisfy condition (5), and derive a bound that only de-
pend on observable distributions. Towards this goal, define
L :=
{
L :W ×Ht? → R+ | L(w;Ht?) ≤ ΓL(w′;Ht?)
a.s. all w,w′, and E[L(W ;Ht?) | Ht? , At? = at? ] = 1
}
. (6)
Taking the infimum over the inner expectation in the expres-
sion derived in Proposition 1, and noting that it does not
depend on a′t? , define
η?(Ht? ; at?) :=
inf
L∈L
E
[
L(W ;Ht?)Y (A1:T )
T∏
t=t?+1
ρt
∣∣∣Ht? , At? = at?] .
Since the above optimization is over infinite-dimensional
likelihoods, it is difficult to compute. We use functional
convex duality to derive a dual relaxation that can be com-
puted by solving a loss minimization problem over any well-
specified model class. This allows us to compute a mean-
ingful lower bound to E[Y (A¯1:T )] even when rewards and
states are continuous, by simply fitting a model using stan-
dard supervised learning methods. For (s)+ = max(s, 0)
and (s)− = −min(s, 0), define the weighted squared loss
`Γ(z) :=
1
2 (Γ(z)
2
− + (z)
2
+).
Theorem 2. Let Assumptions A, D, E hold. If
E[Y (A1:T )2
∏T
t=t?+1 ρ
2
t | At? = at? , Ht? ] <∞ a.s., then
η?(Ht? ; at?) is lower bounded a.s. by the unique solution
κ?(Ht? ; at?) = argmin
f(Ht? )
E
[
1 {At? = at?}
pit?(at? | Ht?)
× `Γ
(
Y (A1:T )
T∏
t=t?+1
ρt − f(Ht?)
)]
.
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See Section C.2 for the proof. From Theorem 2 and Propo-
sition 1, our final lower bound on E[Y (A¯1:T )] is given by
E
[
t?−1∏
t=1
ρt
∑
at?
p¯it?(at? | H¯t?(A1:t?−1))
× (1− pit?(at? | Ht?))κ?(Ht? ; at?)
]
+ E
[
pit?(At? | Ht?)Y (A1:T )
T∏
t=1
ρt
]
. (7)
Our approach yields a loss minimization problem for each
possible action, where the dimension of this supervised
learning problem is that of the observed history Ht∗ gener-
ated from the behavior policy. If confounding occurs early
in the process (t? ≈ 1), the space of possible histories is
small and this learning problem becomes easier. This is the
scenario for the domains we consider in our experiments.
In cases where there is low, yet sufficient, overlap, WIS
can dramatically reduce variance, at the cost of increased
bias, with respect to the usual IS estimator. While our
approach uses the IS to adjust for the differences between
the behavior and evaluation policy, adjusting the bound in
(7) to use WIS, instead, is straightforward. Altering the
importance reweighting inside the loss function for κ? to be
normalized, like WIS, warrants further investigation.
Yadlowsky et al. (2018) takes a similar approach to bound
the effect of confounding on treatment effects when there
is only one action taken. Our approach allows for compar-
ing sequences of actions derived according to an evaluation
policy, by adjusting for the way actions in all time steps
depend on the current states and history, and effect future
states and rewards. One notable challenge that only oc-
curs in sequential problems is adjusting for actions that
occur after the confounded decision at time t?; these ac-
tions depend on the confounded decision through the his-
tory generated. A natural approach is to individually bound
the potential outcomes E[Y (A¯1:t?−1, at?:T )] for all at?:T ,
where each bound is given by a loss minimization problem.
Under this approach—which is analogous to that of Yad-
lowsky et al. (2018) in the single time step—computing a
lower bound to E[Y (A¯1:T )] requires
∏T
t=t? |At| loss min-
imization problems, making it statistically and computa-
tionally intractable when t? is small (e.g. t? = 1 in our
sepsis example). Instead, we consider averaged outcomes
E[Y (A¯1:t?−1, at? , A¯t?+1:T )] in Theorem 2, which allows
us to obtain a lower bound on E[Y (A¯1:T )] by only solving
|At? | loss minimization problems.
Consistency We now show that an empirical approxima-
tion to our loss minimization problem yields a consistent
estimate of κ?(·). We require the following standard over-
lap assumption, which states that actions cannot be too rare
under the behavior policy, relative to the evaluation policy.
Assumption F. There is C ∈ (1,∞) s.t. ∀t, ρt ≤ C, a.s..
Since it is not feasible to optimize over the class of all
functions f(Ht?), we consider a parameterization fθ(Ht?)
where θ ∈ Rd. We provide provable guarantees in the
simplified setting where θ 7→ fθ is linear, so that the loss
minimization problem is convex. That is, we assume that
fθ is represented by a finite linear combination of some
arbitrary basis functions of Ht? . As long as the parameter-
ization is well-specified so that κ?(Ht? ; at?) = fθ?(Ht?)
for some θ? ∈ Θ, an empirical plug-in solution converges
to κ? as the number of samples n grows to infinity. We let
Θ ⊆ Rd be our model space; our theorem allows Θ = Rd.
In the below result, let pit(at | Ht) be a consistent estima-
tor of pit(at | Ht) trained on a separate dataset Dn with
the same underlying distribution; such estimators can be
trained using sample splitting and standard supervised learn-
ing methods. Define the set S of -approximate optimizers
of the empirical plug-in problem
min
f(Ht? )
Ên
[
1 {At? = at?}
pit?(at? | Ht?) `Γ
(
Y (A1:T )
T∏
t=t?+1
ρ̂t − f(Ht?)
)]
,
where Ên is the empirical distribution on the data statistically
independent from Dn, and
ρ̂t :=
p¯i(At | H¯t(A1:t−1))
pit(At | Ht(A1:t−1)) .
We assume we observe i.i.d. episodes, and that each episode
(unit) does not affect one another, so the observed cumula-
tive reward is the evaluation of the potential outcome at the
observed action sequence, Y (A1:T ). We prove the below
result in Section C.3.
Theorem 3. Let Assumptions A, D, E, F hold, and let θ 7→
fθ be linear such that fθ?(·) = κ?(·, at?) for some unique
θ? ∈ Rd. Let E|Y (A1:T )|4 < ∞, and E[|fθ(Ht?)|4] < ∞
for all θ ∈ Θ. If for all t, pit(·|·) → pit(·|·) pointwise
a.s., ρ̂t ≤ 2C, and (2C)−1 ≤ pit?(at? |Ht?) ≤ 1 a.s., then
lim infn→∞ dist(θ?, Sεn)
p→ 0 ∀εn ↓ 0.
Hence, under the hypothesis of Theorem 3, a plug-in esti-
mator of the lower bound (7) is consistent as n→∞.
6. Experiments
We illustrate how our approach can generate meaningful
certificates of robustness to unobserved confounding in re-
alistic scenarios. We consider selecting evaluation policies
using off-policy evaluation methods, such as comparing
the expected performance of a new policy to an existing
policy. We empirically validate our method in sequential
off-policy evaluation problems where confounding is pri-
marily an issue in only a single decision. Since counter-
factual outcomes are only known in simulations, we focus
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Figure 1. Sepsis simulation. Data generation process with
the level of confounding Γ? = 2.0. Each policies’ true
value is shown with a start and a standard OPE estimate
(ignoring confounding) is shown with an empty circle.
Black lines show the estimated upper and lower bound
on policy performance using our approach and red lines
correspond to the naı¨ve approach, both using Γ = 2.0.
Dashed lines represents 95% quantile.
(a) Our approach (b) Naive approach
Figure 2. Sepsis simulator design sensitivity. Data genera-
tion process with level of confounding Γ? = 5. Estimated
lower and upper bound of two policies (with and without
antibiotics) under (a) our approach with design sensitivity
5.6 (b) naive approach with design sensitivity 1.75.
on simulated healthcare examples motivated by two real
OPE applications: management of sepsis patients, and de-
velopmental interventions for autistic children. We select
these examples because they represent interesting cases with
existing simulators. As we argue shortly, it is plausible to
assume that unobserved confounding only affects a single
decision in both settings.
The two scenarios characterize different problem regimes.
The sepsis simulator models discrete state space and the
horizon of decision making (T ) is naturally multiple steps,
and the autism management simulator models continuous-
valued states and horizon T = 2. Our results demonstrate
scalability of our loss minimization approach in both dis-
crete and continuous settings, as well as short and medium
horizons (5 ∼ 10). We observe that beyond 10 time steps,
overlap becomes a problem, and statistical estimation be-
comes challenging.
In both examples, we compare three different approaches:
standard OPE methods that (incorrectly) assume sequen-
tial ignorability, the naı¨ve bound (4), and the bound us-
ing our proposed loss minimization approach (7). All the
code required to reproduce our experiments are available
online at https://github.com/StanfordAI4HI/
off_policy_confounding. In both cases our ap-
proach provides informative bounds on the performance
of the evaluation policy, allowing reliable selection of poli-
cies even under unobserved confounding. Compared to the
naı¨ve approach (4) which is often prohibitively conserva-
tive, our methods allow certifying robustness to much larger
levels of confounding Γ.
6.1. Managing sepsis for ICU patients
As outlined in Section 1.1, automated policies hold much
promise in management of sepsis in ICU patients. However,
ICU observational data about sepsis patients may often lack
information about important confounders, such as important
unrecorded comorbidities that affect a clinician’s initial de-
cision whether to administer antibiotics. In subsequent time
steps, we assume the (highly-trained) clinical care team
follows standard protocols based on vitals signs and lab
measurements, and hence their subsequent decisions are un-
confounded. On the sepsis simulator developed by Oberst
and Sontag (2019), we illustrate how such confounders can
bias OPE methods, and demonstrate that our worst-case
approach can allow reliable selection of candidate policies
under confounding.
We consider a scenario where automated policies have been
proposed using existing medical knowledge, and we wish to
evaluate their benefits relative to the current standard of care.
We evaluate three different policies, all of which only dif-
fer in their initial prescription of antibiotics, and otherwise
act optimally. The first policy, without antibiotics (WO),
does not administer antibiotics initially, whereas the second
policy, with antibiotics (W), always administers antibiotics
initially. For our last policy, we follow Oberst and Sontag
(2019) and use the optimal policy learned by running policy
iteration on this simulator—naturally this procedure does
not have confounding. We stress that our first two policies
are identical to the optimal policy after the initial time step.
The true performance of the with antibiotics (W) and op-
timal policy is quite similar, and better than the without
antibiotics (WO) policy (see Figure 1).
To simulate unrecorded comorbidities that could introduce
confounding, we extract the randomness that governs state
transitions into a confounding variable so that the con-
founder is correlated with better state transitions. In the
first time step, we take the optimal action with respect to
all other options (vasopressors and mechanical ventilation),
and administer antibiotics with probability
√
Γ?/(1 +
√
Γ?)
if the confounding variable is large, and with probability
1/(1 +
√
Γ?) if the confounding variable is small. This
confounder satisfies Assumption E with level Γ?. Note that
Γ? is used in the data generation process, but is unknown to
the procedure used to estimate (bounds on) the evaluation
policy performance. We run our method with varying levels
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(a) Case I (b) Case II
Figure 3. Autism simulation. Outcome of two different
policies, confounded adaptive policy (BLI+AAC) and un-
confounded non-adaptive policy (AAI). Data generation
process with the level of confounding Γ? = 2.0.
of Γ, and look at thresholds at which the bounds on the
performance of evaluation policies cross each other (which
we refer to as the design sensitivity).
To generate our observational data, we assume that the care
team acts nearly optimally, except for some randomness
due to challenges in the ICU; this guarantees overlap (As-
sumption F) with respect to the optimal evaluation policy.
In all but the first time step, we let the behavior policy take
the optimal next treatment action with probability 0.85, and
otherwise switch the vasopressor status, independent of the
confounders; this guarantees that the assumption of single
time step confounding (Assumption D) holds.
Oberst and Sontag (2019)’s simulator state space consists
of a binary indicator for diabetes, and four vital signs {heart
rate, blood pressure, oxygen concentration and glucose
level} that take values in a subset of {very high, high, nor-
mal, low, very low}; size of the state space is |St| = 1440.
There are three binary treatment options for {antibiotics,
vasopressors, and mechanical ventilation}, so that the ac-
tion space has cardinality |At| = 23. In our experiments,
simulation continues either until at most T = 5 (hori-
zon) time steps, death (reward -1), or discharge (reward
+1). Patients are discharged when all vital signs are in
the normal range without treatment. Patients die if at
least three vitals are out of the normal range. We refer
the reader to https://github.com/clinicalml/
gumbel-max-scm for details regarding the simulator.
We first consider when our approach happens to use the
same confounding degree as what is present in the simula-
tor, Γ = Γ?. Figure 1 plots the value of the three evaluation
decision policies estimated using the data generated with
Γ? = 2.0, which is a fairly small amount of confound-
ing. Confounding leads standard OPE methods that assume
sequential ignorability for the behavior policy to underesti-
mate the peformance of the without antibiotics (WO) policy,
and overestimate the performance of the with antibiotics
(W) and optimal policies. This inflates the expected benefit
of the W and optimal policies compared to the WO policy.
Figure 4. Autism simulation design sensitivity. Data gen-
eration process with the level of confounding Γ? = 1.0.
True value of adaptive (BLI+AAC) and non-adaptive
(AAC) policies along with estimated lower bound on out-
come using our and naive approach
The naive approach (4) results in very wide estimated in-
tervals over the potential policy performance, and therefore
cannot be used to reliably infer the superiority of W and
optimal policy over WO even when Γ = 2.0. On the other
hand, our proposed method certifies the robustness of the
benefit of immediately administering antibiotics; our lower
bounds on the performance of the W and optimal policies
are better than the upper bound on the performance under
the WO policy.
We next consider a much larger amount of confounding,
generating the observational data with Γ? = 5.0. To explore
the design sensitivity of our method and our naiı¨ve lower
bound approach, we use a range of Γ values in our method.
Figure 2 shows that for our method, the lower bound on
the performance of the W policy meets the upper bound on
that of the WO policy at Γ = 5.6. In other words, our ap-
proach can reliably estimate that the W policy is better than
the WO policy up to assuming an amount of confounding
determined by Γ = 5.6 when the true Γ? = 5.0. In contrast,
our proposed naı¨ve bound (4) has a a design sensitivity of
Γ = 1.75, meaning the bounds quickly fails to be informa-
tive far below the true amount of data confounding. Our
method allow concluding that the W policy is superior to the
WO policy even when a substantial amount of unobserved
confounding exists in the initial decision.
6.2. Communication interventions for minimally verbal
children with autism
We next consider another motivating scenario from health-
care, but one which naturally involves continuous variables
to demonstrate that our approach is also able to compute rea-
sonable lower bounds for such a case, while using function
approximation.
Minimally verbal children represent 25-30% of children
with autism, and often have poor prognosis in terms of so-
cial functioning (Rutter et al., 1967; Anderson et al., 2009).
We are interested in comparing non-adaptive versus adap-
tive approaches that aim to improve spoken communication,
measured by the number of speech utterances. We intro-
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duce confounding using a simulator for autistic children
developed by Lu et al. (2016), which models the data from
a (real) sequential, multiple assignment, randomized trial
(SMART) (Kasari et al., 2014). Despite their randomized
trial, Kasari et al. (2014) note that very few randomized trials
of these interventions exist, and the number of individuals
in these trials tends to be small. It is therefore reasonable
to think that in similar settings it would be beneficial to
use existing off-policy data to evaluate new intervention
protocols.
In the simulator there are two developmental interventions
(actions): behavioral language interventions (BLI) delivered
by a therapist, and an augmented/alternative communication
(AAC) approach implemented with a speech generation
device. There are two decision points in the data generation
process: week 0 and week 12. Number of speech utterances
are measured at week 0, 12, 24 and 36: note that the action
/ intervention applied at week 12 persists from week 12
to the end of the process, which means this is a 2 time
step decision problem. Here the outcome is modeled as
a continuous variable representing the average number of
speech utterances for a given patient.
We consider a scenario where participants were recruited
and randomly assigned to the two treatment options initially
(i.e., A1 ∼ Unif({BLI,AAC})), and a recourse action is
taken after a follow-up visit after 12 weeks. Depending
on the progress of patients at Week 12, the clinician de-
cides whether to switch to AAC devices for children who
started with BLI. Since this intervention requires a special-
ized device—whose supply is limited—it is likely that the
clinicians assign AAC devices for whom it has a higher
chance of being effective. Such subjective assessments are
likely based on the their interaction with patients that contain
partial, noisy information about the final outcome, which
are often not recorded properly. Therefore, while there is
confounding in the second decision (t? = 2), its influence
may be appropriately bounded (i.e., Assumption D is plausi-
ble). To simulate confounding, we expand the simulator to
create variables that partially influences the effectiveness of
switching from BLI to AAC, and use knowledge of this to
alter the behavior policy decisions at Week 12. The resulting
confounding satisfies our model of bounded confounding
(Assumption D) and is described in detail in Appendix D.2.
In our evaluations, we compare an adaptive policy (BLI +
AAC) that starts with BLI, and augments BLI with AAC
at week 12 if the patient is a slow responder, against a non-
adaptive policy that uses AAC through the whole treatment.
We simulate two different settings where the effect of switch-
ing to the AAC treatment varies; our simulation parameters
are within the suggested range of Lu et al. (2016)’s recom-
mendations based on the SMART trial data. We note that
OPE estimates for the non-adaptive policy (AAC) is unbi-
ased since observations for this outcome are unconfounded.
Our loss minimization for computing the lower bound using
κ(at? , Ht?) is done using a 4 layers neural network with
Relu activations, we use backpropogation with AdamOpti-
mizer and weighted squared loss given in Theorem 2. We
use logistic regression to estimate the behavior policy, note
that this is the marginalized behavior policy since the latent
confounder is unobserved.
In Case I, we define the parameters such that the adaptive
policy (BLI+AAC) is worse the non-adaptive policy (AAC)
(lower true outcome / performance). As shown in Figure 3
(a), standard OPE approach overestimates the outcome of
the adaptive policy even given a mild level of confounding
Γ? = 2.0, and would incorrectly suggest the BLI+AAC
policy outperforms the AAC policy. On the other hand,
our lower bounds on the adaptive policy computed using
Γ = 2 (recall the true confounding amount is unknown to
our approach) suggest the OPE estimates may be biased
enough to affect conclusions; the observed advantages of
the adaptive policy may be attributed solely to unobserved
confounding, even under reasonable values of confounding
(Γ = 2).
In Case II, we change the parameters so that the BLI+AAC
policy is better than the AAC policy, and again use a true
amount of confounding of Γ? = 2.0 in the data genera-
tion process. Standard OPE estimates again overestimate
the outcome for the BLI+AAC policy (Figure 3(b)). The
naı¨ve lower bound results in a conservative lower bound that
would again indicate no conclusions can be drawn about the
relative performance of BLI+AAC versus AAC. However,
our method can certify the superiority of the BLI+AAC pol-
icy when the level of confounding used in the computation
of the lower bounds is up to Γ = 4.2, thereby providing a
case where our approach can provide useful certificates of
benefit of a new decision policy under non-trivial levels of
confounding.
Figure 4 plots the design sensitivity of our method against
the naı¨ve approach (4), when there is in fact no confounding
in the data generation process (Γ? = 1). Compared to
the naive approach (design sensitivity is Γ = 1.32), our
method allows certifying robustness of the finding—that the
adaptive policy is advantageous—up to realistic levels of
confounding (design sensitivity is Γ = 2.78).
7. Discussion
In this work, we proposed methods for analyzing the sen-
sitivity of OPE methods to unobserved confounding in se-
quential decision making problems. We demonstrated how
our approach can certify robustness of OPE in some settings,
or raise concerns about its validity based on sensitivity to
unobserved confounding. Our loss minimization method
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allows computing worst-case bounds over our bounded un-
observed confounding model, while adjusting for observed
features via importance sampling.
As a consequence, our estimators face the same challenges
that standard importance-sampling-based OPE methods
face: high variance when there is little overlap between
the evaluation and behavior policy. In our experiments,
importance sampling was effective since we ensured that
there was sufficient overlap and focused on shorter hori-
zons. In other settings, lack of overlap poses fundamen-
tal difficulties in off policy evaluation, beyond issues with
confounding, as others have also noted (Gottesman et al.,
2019a). Such challenges become pronounced as the horizon
T or the importance sampling weights (1) become large.
While stationary importance sampling (SIS) can reduce vari-
ance, rewards under stationary distributions (should they
exist) are not appropriate for the problems studied in this
paper; SIS (Hallak and Mannor, 2017; Liu et al., 2018a;
Xie et al., 2019; Liu et al., 2019) nevertheless still suffers
high variance when there is a lack of overlap. Fujimoto et al.
(2019) and Kumar et al. (2019) suggest some promising al-
gorithmic approaches for only considering (and optimizing
over) policies with sufficient overlap: while more work is
needed, policies generated by these approaches would be
more amenable to OPE, and should improve the statistical
properties of our method.
It is natural to consider extending our single-decision con-
founding model to settings where a handful of decisions
(say 2-5) are affected by unobserved confounding. Worst-
case bounds on E[Y (A¯1:T )] under such extensions require
solving optimization problems involving products of likeli-
hood ratios defined over different confounded time periods.
Since these problems are nonconvex, they require new ap-
proaches than the one we take here, which heavily depends
on applying convex duality.
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A. Proof of basic lemmas
Before we give the proof of our main results, we give a set of essentially standard lemmas that we build on in the rest of
the paper. In the following, we use a notational shorthand for (nested) expectations under observable distributions: for all
1 ≤ t ≤ T and 1 ≤ t1 ≤ t2 ≤ T ,
Etat [X] := E[X | Ht, At = at] and (8a)
Et1:t2at1:t2 [X] := E
t1
at1
[Et1+1at1+1 [· · ·E
t2
at2
[X] · · · ]]. (8b)
Similarly, we write for all 1 ≤ t0 ≤ t1 ≤ t2 ≤ T
Et2at1:t2 [X] := E[X | Ht(A1:t1−1, at1:t2−1), At2 = at2 ] and (9a)
Et1:t2at0:t2 [X] := E
t1
at0:t1
[Et1+1at0:t1+1 [· · ·E
t2
at0:t2
[X] · · · ]]. (9b)
The cumulative rewards E[Y (A¯1:T )] under the candidate policy has an alternate representation, which we draw on heavily
in the rest of the proofs. See Section A.1 for a derivation.
Lemma 4. If sequential ignorability (Assumption A) holds for the evaluation policy p¯i, we have the identity
E
[
Y (A¯1:T )
]
=
∑
a1:T
E
[
Y (a1:T )
T∏
t=1
p¯it(at | H¯t(a1:t−1))
]
.
To ease notation, denote each integrand in the above sum by
Y (a1:T ; p¯i) := Y (a1:T )
T∏
t=1
p¯it(at | H¯t(a1:t−1)). (10)
We will also use the following two identities heavily. Recall that we denote by W := {W (a1:T )}a1:T , the tuple of all
potential outcomes, which takes values inW . See Section A.2 for a proof of the following result.
Lemma 5. Let sequential ignorability (Assumption A) hold for the behavioral policy pi in the time steps t1 : t2, where
1 ≤ t1 < t2 ≤ T . Then, for any measurable f :W → R
E[f(W ) | Ht1(a1:t1−1)] = E
[
Et1:t2a1:t2 [f(W )] | Ht1(a1:t1−1)
]
for any a1:t2 ∈ A1 × · · · × At2 .
The following identity—whose proof we give in Section A.3—is a simple consequence of the definition of conditional
expectations, and the tower law.
Lemma 6. For any measurable function f :W → R, and 1 ≤ t1 ≤ t2 ≤ T ,
Et1:t2a1:t2 f(W ) = E
[
f(W )
t2∏
t=t1
1 {AT = at}
pit(at | Ht(a1:t−1)) | Ht1(a1:t1−1)
]
A.1. Proof of Lemma 4
Similar to the notational shorthand (8), define
Eta1:t [X] := E[X | H¯t(a1:t−1), A¯t = at] and E
t:T
a1:T [X] = E
t
a1:t [E
t+1
a1:t+1 [· · ·E
T
a1:T [X] · · · ]].
Begin by noting that by definition of conditional expectation
E[Y (A¯1:T ) | H¯1] =
∑
a1∈A1
p¯i(a1 | H¯1)E[Y (a1, A¯2:T ) | H¯1, A¯1 = a1]
=
∑
a1∈A1
p¯i(a1 | H¯1)E1a1 [Y (a1, A¯2:T )],
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and similarly, conditioning on H¯2(a1) = (S1, A¯1 = a1, S2(a1)) yields
E[Y (a1, A¯2:T ) | H¯2(a1)] =
∑
a2∈A2
p¯i2(a2 | H¯2(a1))E[Y (a1:2, A¯3:T ) | H¯2(a1), A¯2 = a2]
=
∑
a2∈A2
p¯i2(a2 | H¯2(a1))E2a1:2 [Y (a1:2, A¯3:T )].
From the tower law, the above two equalities yield
E[Y (A¯1:T )] = E
[ ∑
a1∈A1
p¯i1(a1 | H¯1)E
[ ∑
a2∈A
p¯i2(a2 | H¯2(a1)) · E[Y (a1:2, A¯3:T ) | H¯2(a1), A¯2 = a2]
∣∣∣∣∣H¯1, A¯1 = a1
]]
= E
[ ∑
a1∈A1
p¯i1(a1 | H¯1)E1a1
[ ∑
a2∈A
p¯i2(a2 | H¯2(a1)) · E2a1:2 [Y (a1:2, A¯3:T )]
]]
.
Proceeding iteratively as before and expanding each E[Y (a1:t−1, A¯t:T ) | H¯t(a1:t−1)], we arrive at
E[Y (A¯1:T )]
= E
[ ∑
a1∈A1
p¯i1(a1 | H¯1)E1a1
[
E2a1:2
[ ∑
a2∈A2
p¯i2(a2 | H¯2(a1))E3a1:3
[
· · ·
∑
aT∈AT
p¯iT (aT | H¯T (a1:T−1))ETa1:T [Y (a1:T )]
]]]]
.
Now, we proceed backwards from the inner most expectation to take the outer sum inside the expectation. By Assumption A,
we have∑
aT∈AT
p¯iT (aT | H¯T (a1:T−1))ETa1:T [Y (a1:T )] =
∑
aT∈AT
p¯iT (aT | H¯T (a1:T−1)) · E
[
Y (a1:T )
∣∣∣∣∣ H¯T (a1:T−1)
]
= E
[ ∑
aT∈AT
p¯iT (aT | H¯T (a1:T−1)) · Y (a1:T )
∣∣∣∣ H¯T (a1:T−1)
]
.
Noting that E[· | H¯T (a1:T−1)] = E[· | H¯T−1(a1:T−2), ST (a1:T−1), A¯T−1=aT−1], the tower law and preceding display
yield
ET−1a1:T−1
[ ∑
aT∈AT
p¯iT (aT | H¯T (a1:T−1)) · ETa1:T [Y (a1:T )]
]
= ET−1a1:T−1
[ ∑
aT∈AT
p¯iT (aT | H¯T (a1:T−1)) · Y (a1:T )
]
.
We repeat an identical process for the sum over aT−1. Similarly as above, applying Assumption A gives∑
aT−1∈AT−1
p¯iT−1(aT−1 | H¯T−1(a1:T−2)) · ET−1a1:T−1
[ ∑
aT∈AT
p¯iT (aT | H¯T (a1:T−1)) · Y (a1:T )
]
= E
 ∑
aT−1∈AT−1
p¯iT−1(aT−1 | H¯T−1(a1:T−2))
∑
aT∈AT
p¯iT (aT | H¯T (a1:T−1)) · Y (a1:T )
∣∣∣∣ H¯T−1(a1:T−2)
 .
By the tower law, we again get
ET−2a1:T−2
 ∑
aT−1∈AT−1
p¯iT−1(aT−1 | H¯T−1(a1:T−2))ET−1a1:T−1
[ ∑
aT∈AT
p¯iT (aT | H¯T (a1:T−1)) · Y (a1:T )
]
= ET−2a1:T−2
 ∑
aT−1∈AT−1
p¯iT−1(aT−1 | H¯T−1(a1:T−2)) ·
∑
aT∈AT
p¯iT (aT | H¯T (a1:T−1)) · Y (a1:T )
 .
Iterating the above process over the indices t = T − 2, . . . , 1, we arrive at the desired formula.
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A.2. Proof of Lemma 5
From the tower law and sequential ignorability of pi,
E[f(W ) | Ht1(a1:t1−1)] = E[f(W ) | Ht1(a1:t1−1), At1 = at1 ]
= E[E[f(W ) | Ht1+1(a1:t1)] | Ht1(a1:t1−1), At1 = at1 ]
Applying the tower law to the inner expectation, and applying sequential ignorability again, we get
E[f(W ) | Ht1+1(a1:t1)] = E [E[f(W ) | Ht1+2(a1:t1+1)] | Ht1+1(a1:t1), At1+1 = at1+1]
Plugging this back into the original display, we have
E[f(W ) | Ht1(a1:t1−1)] = Et1:t1+1a1:t1+1 [E[f(W ) | Ht1+2(a1:t1+1)]]
Repeating this argument over t = t1 + 2, . . . , t2, we conclude the result.
A.3. Proof of Lemma 6
From the definition of conditional expectations, we have
E[f(W ) | Ht(a1:t−1), At = at] = E
[
f(W )
1 {At = at}
pit(at | Ht(a1:t−1)) | Ht(a1:t−1)
]
.
The result follows by applying this equality at t = t2, applying the tower law, and iterating the same argument over
t = t2 − 1, . . . , t1.
B. Proof of key identities
B.1. Proof of Lemma 1
Recalling the notation (10), sequential ignorability of p¯i and Lemma 4 gives the following representation
E
[
Y (A¯1:T )
]
=
∑
a1:T
E [Y (a1:T ; p¯i)] .
We deal with each term E[Y (a1:T ; p¯i)] in the summation separately, for each fixed sequence of actions a1:T . From sequential
ignorability of pi and Lemma 5,
E[Y (a1:T ; p¯i)] = E[E1a1 [· · ·ETa1:T [Y (a1:T ; p¯i)] · · · ]] = E[E1:Ta1:T [Y (a1:T ; p¯i)]].
Applying Lemma 6, we get
E[Y (a1:T ; p¯i)] = E[Y (a1:T ; p¯i)
T∏
t=1
1 {At = at}
pit(at | Ht(a1:t−1)) ].
Summing the preceeding display over a1:T , we obtain the desired result.
B.2. Proof of Proposition 1
From Lemma 4, we have
E[Y (A¯1:T )] = E
[∑
a1:T
Y (a1:T )
T∏
t=1
p¯it(at | H¯t(a1:t−1))
]
.
Since sequential ignorability for pi holds at any t < t?, Lemma 5 implies that the preceeding display is equal to
E
 ∑
a1:t?−1
E1:t
?−1
a1:t?−1
[∑
at?:T
Y (a1:T )
T∏
t=1
p¯it(at | H¯t(a1:t−1))
] .
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Applying Lemma 6 to the inner expectations, we get
E[Y (A¯1:T )] = E
 ∑
a1:t?−1
t?−1∏
t=1
1 {At = at}
pit(at | Ht(a1:t−1))
∑
at?:T
Y (a1:T )
T∏
t=1
p¯it(at | H¯t(a1:t−1))

= E
[
t?−1∏
t=1
p¯it(At | H¯t(A1:t−1))
pit(At | Ht)
∑
at?:T
Y (A1:t?−1, at?:T )
T∏
t=t?
p¯it(at | H¯t(A1:t?−1, at?:t−1))
]
.
From the tower law, we arrive at
E[Y (A¯1:T )] = E
[
E
[
t?−1∏
t=1
p¯it(At | H¯t(A1:t−1))
pit(At | Ht)
∑
at?:T
Y (A1:t?−1, at?:T )
T∏
t=t?
p¯it(at | H¯t(A1:t?−1, at?:t−1))
∣∣∣∣∣ Ht?
]]
= E
[
t?−1∏
t=1
p¯it(At | H¯t(A1:t−1))
pit(At | Ht) E
[∑
at?:T
Y (A1:t?−1, at?:T )
T∏
t=t?
p¯it(at | H¯t(A1:t?−1, at?:t−1))
∣∣∣∣∣ Ht?
]]
.
(12)
Applying the tower law to the inner expectation in the final display, we can write
E
[∑
at?:T
Y (A1:t?−1, at?:T )
T∏
t=t?
p¯it(at | H¯t(A1:t?−1, at?:t−1))
∣∣∣∣∣ Ht?
]
= E
[
E
[∑
at?:T
Y (A1:t?−1, at?:T )
T∏
t=t?
p¯it(at | H¯t(A1:t?−1, at?:t−1))
∣∣∣∣∣ Ht? , At?
] ∣∣∣∣∣ Ht?
]
=
∑
at? ,a
′
t?
p¯it?(at? | H¯t?(A1:t?−1))pit?(a′t? | Ht?)
× E
 ∑
at?+1:T
Y (A1:t?−1, at?:T )
T∏
t=t?+1
p¯it(at | H¯t(A1:t?−1, at?:t−1))
∣∣∣∣∣ Ht? , At? = a′t?

=
∑
at? ,a
′
t?
p¯it?(at? | H¯t?(A1:t?−1))pit?(a′t? | Ht?)
× E
L(W ;Ht? , at? , a′t?) ∑
at?+1:T
Y (A1:t?−1, at?:T )
T∏
t=t?+1
p¯it(at | H¯t(A1:t?−1, at?:t−1))
∣∣∣∣∣ Ht? , At? = at?

where in the last equality, we used the definition
L(·;Ht? , at? , a′t?) :=
dPW (· | Ht? , At? = a′t?)
dPW (· | Ht? , At? = at?) .
Again, by the tower law,
E
L(W ;Ht? , at? , a′t?) ∑
at?+1:T
Y (A1:t?−1, at?:T )
T∏
t=t?+1
p¯it(at | H¯t(A1:t?−1, at?:t−1))
∣∣∣∣∣ Ht? , At? = at?

= E
[
E
[
L(W ;Ht? , at? , a′t?)
∑
at?+1:T
Y (A1:t?−1, at?:T )
×
T∏
t=t?+1
p¯it(at | H¯t(A1:t?−1, at?:t−1))
∣∣∣Ht?+1(A1:t?−1, at?)]
∣∣∣∣∣ Ht? , At? = at?
]
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From sequential ignorability of pi for t > t? and Lemma 5, the preceeding display is equal to
E
 ∑
at?+1:T
Et
?+1:T
at?:T
L(W ;Ht? , at? , a′t?)Y (A1:t?−1, at?:T )
T∏
t=t?+1
p¯it(at | H¯t(A1:t?−1, at?:t−1))
∣∣∣∣∣ Ht? , At? = at?
 .
From Lemma 6, we can rewrite the above expression as
E
[
L(W ;Ht? , at? , a′t?)Yt?(at?)
T∏
t=t?+1
p¯it(At | H¯t(A1:t?−1, at? , At?+1:t))
pit(At | Ht(A1:t?−1, at? , At?+1:t))
∣∣∣∣∣ Ht? , At? = at?
]
.
Plugging these expressions back into the equality (12), we obtain the result.
C. Proof of bounds under unobserved confounding
C.1. Naive bound
We show the below more general result.
Lemma 7. Let Assumptions A, B, C hold. Then, we have
E[Y (A¯1:T )] ≥ E
[
Y (A1:T )
T∏
t=1
p¯it(At | H¯t(A1:t−1))
pit(At | Ht)(Γ−1t 1 {Y (A1:T ) < 0}+ Γt1 {Y (A1:T ) > 0})
]
.
Proof of Lemma From an identical argument as the proof of Lemma 1, Assumption B yields
E[Y (A¯1:T )] = E
[
Y (A1:T )
T∏
t=1
p¯it(At | H¯t(A1:t−1), Ut)
pit(At | Ht, Ut)
]
.
From Assumption A, the preceeding display is equal to
E[Y (A¯1:T )] = E
[
Y (A1:T )
T∏
t=1
p¯it(At | H¯t(A1:t−1))
pit(At | Ht, Ut)
]
. (13)
Now, we bound pit(At | Ht, Ut) by pit(At | Ht). Assumption C implies
pit(at | Ht, Ut = ut)pit(a′t | Ht, Ut = u′t) ≤ Γtpit(a′t | Ht, Ut = ut)pit(at | Ht, Ut = u′t).
Multiplying by pUt(u
′
t | Ht) on both sides and integrating over u′t, we get
pit(at | Ht, Ut = ut)pit(a′t | Ht) ≤ Γtpit(a′t | Ht, Ut = ut)pit(at | Ht).
Summing over a′t on both sides, we conclude that
pit(at | Ht, Ut = ut) ≤ Γtpit(at | Ht).
almost surely, for any t, at, Ht, ut. Using this relation to lower bound expression (13), we obtain the result.
C.2. Proof of Theorem 2
By rewriting the original infimization problem over L(W ;Ht?) to L(W,At?+1:T ;Ht?), we have
η?(Ht? ; at?) =
inf
L≥0
{
E
[
L(W,At?+1:T ;Ht?)Y (A1:T )
T∏
t=t?+1
ρt
∣∣∣ Ht? , At? = at?] : E[L(W,At?+1:T ;Ht?) | Ht? , At? = at? ] = 1, and
L(w, at?+1:T ;Ht?) = L(w, a
′
t?+1:T ;Ht?), L(w, at?+1:T ;Ht?) ≤ ΓL(w′, a′t?+1:T ;Ht?) a.s. all w, at?+1:T , w′, a′t?+1:T
}
.
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Relaxing the equality constraint L(w, at?+1:T ;Ht?) = L(w, a′t?+1:T ;Ht?), we arrive at
η?(Ht? ; at?) ≥
inf
L≥0
{
E
[
L(W,At?+1:T ;Ht?)Y (A1:T )
T∏
t=t?+1
ρt
∣∣∣ Ht? , At? = at?] : E[L(W,At?+1:T ;Ht?) | Ht? , At? = at? ] = 1, and
L(w, at?+1:T ;Ht?) ≤ ΓL(w′, a′t?+1:T ;Ht?) a.s. all w, at?+1:T , w′, a′t?+1:T
}
.
The preceeding optimization problem is convex, and Slater’s condition holds for L ≡ 1. By strong duality (Luenberger,
1969, Thm. 8.6.1 and Problem 8.7), we obtain the dual formulation
sup
µ
inf
L≥0
{
E
[
L(W,At?+1:T ;Ht?)
(
Y (A1:T )
T∏
t=t?+1
ρt − µ
) ∣∣∣ Ht? , At? = at?]+ µ :
L(w, at?+1:T ;Ht?) ≤ ΓL(w′, a′t?+1:T ;Ht?) a.s. all w, at?+1:T , w′, a′t?+1:T
}
.
By inspection, the solution to the inner infimum takes the form
L(w, at?+1:T ;Ht?) = c
(
Γ1
{
Y (A1:T )
T∏
t=t?+1
ρt − µ < 0
}
+ 1
{
Y (A1:T )
T∏
t=t?+1
ρt − µ ≥ 0
})
for some constant c > 0. Let `′Γ(z) := (z)+−Γ(z)−, the derivative of the weighted squared loss `Γ(z) = 12 (Γ(z)2−+(z)2+).
Plugging the preceeding display into the dual formulation, we get
sup
µ
inf
c≥0
{
cE
[
`′Γ
(
Y (A1:T )
T∏
t=t?+1
ρt − µ
) ∣∣∣ Ht? , At? = at?]+ µ}
= sup
µ
{
µ : E
[
`′Γ
(
Y (A1:T )
T∏
t=t?+1
ρt − µ
) ∣∣∣ Ht? , At? = at?] ≥ 0}.
Since the function µ 7→ E
[
`′Γ
(
Y (A1:T )
∏T
t=t?+1 ρt − µ
) ∣∣∣ Ht? , At? = at?] is strictly decreasing, the optimal solution
(and its value) in the preceeding display is given by the unique zero of this function.
We now show that the solution to our loss minimization problem
κ(Ht? ; at?) = argmin
f(Ht? )
{
E
[
1 {At? = at?}
pit?(at? | Ht?) × `Γ
(
Y (A1:T )
T∏
t=t?+1
ρt − f(Ht?)
)]
= E
[
E
[
`Γ
(
Y (A1:T )
T∏
t=t?+1
ρt − f(Ht?)
) ∣∣∣∣∣ Ht? , At? = at?
]]}
is in fact the unique zero of the function µ 7→ E
[
`′Γ
(
Y (A1:T )
∏T
t=t?+1 ρt − µ
) ∣∣∣ Ht? , At? = at?]. The (almost sure)
uniqueness of the solution follows from strong convexity of `Γ. Since the optimization is over all Ht? -measurable functions,
the argmin is given by
argmin
f(Ht? )
E
[
`Γ
(
Y (A1:T )
T∏
t=t?+1
ρt − f(Ht?)
) ∣∣∣∣∣ Ht? , At? = at?
]
.
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So long as E[Y (A1:T )2
∏T
t=t?+1 ρ
2
t | At? = at? , Ht? ] < ∞ almost surely, first order optimality conditions of this loss
minimization problem is equivalent to E
[
`′Γ
(
Y (A1:T )
∏T
t=t?+1 ρt − f(Ht?)
) ∣∣∣ Ht? , At? = at?] = 0, which gives our
result.
C.3. Proof of Theorem 3
Our result is based on epi-convergence theory (King and Wets, 1991; Rockafellar and Wets, 1998), which shows (uniform)
convergence of convex functions, and solutions to convex optimization problems.
Definition 2. Let {An} be a sequence of subsets of Rd. The limit supremum (or limit exterior or outer limit) and limit
infimum (limit interior or inner limit) of the sequence {An} are
lim sup
n
An :=
{
v ∈ Rd | lim inf
n→∞ dist(v,An) = 0
}
and
lim inf
n
An :=
{
v ∈ Rd | lim sup
n→∞
dist(v,An) = 0
}
.
The epigraph of a function h : Rd → R ∪ {+∞} is epih := {(x, t) ∈ Rd × R | h(x) ≤ t}. We say limnA = A∞ if
lim supnAn = lim infnAn = A∞ ⊂ Rd. We define a notion of convergence for functions in terms of their epigraphs.
Definition 3. A sequence of functions hn epi-converges to a function h, denoted hn
epi→ h, if
epih = lim inf
n→∞ epihn = lim supn→∞
epihn. (14)
If h is proper (domh 6= ∅), epigraphical convergence (14) is characterizaed by pointwise convergence on a dense set.
Lemma 8 (Theorem 7.17, Rockafellar and Wets (1998)). Let hn : Rd → R, h : Rd → R be closed, convex, and proper.
Then hn
epi→ h is equivalent to either of the following two conditions.
(i) There exists a dense set A ⊂ Rd such that hn(v)→ h(v) for all v ∈ A.
(ii) For all compact C ⊂ domh not containing a boundary point of domh,
lim
n→∞ supv∈C
|hn(v)− h(v)| = 0.
The last characterization of epigraphical convergence is powerful as it gives convergence of solution sets.
Lemma 9 (Theorem 7.31, Rockafellar and Wets (1998)). Let hn : Rd → R, h : Rd → R satisfy hn epi→ h and −∞ <
inf h <∞. Let Sn(ε) = {θ | hn(θ) ≤ inf hn + ε} and S(ε) = {θ | h(θ) ≤ inf h+ ε}. Then lim supn Sn(ε) ⊂ S(ε) for
all ε ≥ 0, and lim supn Sn(εn) ⊂ S(0) whenever εn ↓ 0.
From Lemmas 8, 9, it suffices to show that the expected loss function and its empirical counterpart satisfies appropriate
regularity conditions (proper and closed), and show that our empirical loss pointwise converges to the population loss almost
surely. Recall that Dn is the split of data used to estimate pi, and let D∞ be the σ-algebra defined by Dn as n→∞. Our
subsequent argument will be conditional on D∞, and the event
E := {pit → pit pointwise, ρ̂t ≤ 2C, and pit?(at? | Ht?) ∈ [(2C)−1, 1]} .
We assume w.l.o.g. (increasing C if necessary) that c ≤ (2C)−1. Note that P(E) = 1 by assumption.
First, note that since θ 7→ fθ is linear, θ 7→ `Γ(Y (A1:T )
∏T
t=t?+1 ρ̂t − fθ(Ht?)) is convex. Both the empirical and
population loss
θ 7→ Ên
[
1 {At? = at?}
pit?(at? | Ht?) `Γ
(
Y (A1:T )
T∏
t=t?+1
ρ̂t − fθ(Ht?)
)]
=: ĥn(θ),
θ 7→ E
[
1 {At? = at?}
pit?(at? | Ht?) `Γ
(
Y (A1:T )
T∏
t=t?+1
ρt − fθ(Ht?)
)]
=: h(θ),
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are proper since they are nonnegative, and finite a.s. at θ = 0. Since the functions
θ 7→ 1 {At? = at?}
pit?(at? | Ht?) `Γ
(
Y (A1:T )
T∏
t=t?+1
ρ̂t − fθ(Ht?)
)
,
θ 7→ 1 {At? = at?}
pit?(at? | Ht?) `Γ
(
Y (A1:T )
T∏
t=t?+1
ρt − fθ(Ht?)
)
,
are continuous by linearity of θ 7→ fθ, dominated convergence shows continuity of both the empirical loss ĥn(θ) (a.s.) and
population loss h(θ).
Next, we show that the empirical plug-in loss converges pointwise to its population counterpart almost surely. Since
S(0) = {θ?} by hypothesis, Lemmas 8, 9 will give the final result. Defining the function
hn(θ) := E
[
1 {At? = at?}
pit?(at? | Ht?) `Γ
(
Y (A1:T )
T∏
t=t?+1
ρ̂t − fθ(Ht?)
)]
,
we write
|ĥn(θ)− h(θ)| ≤ |hn(θ)− h(θ)|+ |ĥn(θ)− hn(θ)|,
and show that each term in the right hand side converges to 0 almost surely.
To show that the first term goes to zero, note that since pit? → pit? a.s., we have pit?(at? | Ht) ≥ (2C)−1 a.s. for all at? .
This gives
|hn(θ)− h(θ)| ≤
∣∣∣∣∣hn(θ)− E
[
1 {At? = at?}
pit?(at? | Ht?) `Γ
(
Y (A1:T )
T∏
t=t?+1
ρ̂t − fθ(Ht?)
)]∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣E
[
1 {At? = at?}
pit?(at? | Ht?) `Γ
(
Y (A1:T )
T∏
t=t?+1
ρ̂t − fθ(Ht?)
)]
− h(θ)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ ΓC2E
[
|pit?(at? | Ht?)− pit?(at? | Ht?)| ·
(
Y (A1:T )
2(2C)2T + 2|fθ(Ht?)|2
)
+ ΓCE
[ (
Y (A1:T )2(2C)
T + 2|fθ(Ht?)|
) · Y (A1:T ) ·
∣∣∣∣∣
T∏
t=t?+1
ρ̂t −
T∏
t=t?+1
ρt
∣∣∣∣∣
]
,
which has an integrable envelope function under our assumptions and conditional on E . By dominated convergence, we
have the result since pit → pit almost surely (and hence ρ̂t a.s.→ ρt).
To show that the second term converges to zero, we use the following strong law of large numbers for triangular arrays.
Lemma 10 (Hu et al. (1989, Theorem 2)). Let {ξni}ni=1 be a triangular array where Xn1, Xn2, . . . are independent random
variables for any fixed n. If there exists ξ such that |ξni| ≤ ξ and E[ξ2] <∞, then 1n
∑n
i=1(ξni − E[ξni]) a.s.→ 0.
The random variable
1 {At? = at?}
pit?(at? | Ht?) `Γ
(
Y (A1:T )
T∏
t=t?+1
ρ̂t − fθ(Ht?)
)
are i.i.d. for each trajectory, conditional on D∞. By convexity, the below random variable upper bounds the preceeding
display
ξ = 16Γ(2C)2T
(
fθ(Ht?)
2 + Y (A1:T )
2
)
on the event E . From hypothesis, we have E[ξ2 | D∞, E ] <∞. Applying Lemma 10 conditional onD∞ and E , we conclude
|ĥn(θ)− hn(θ)| a.s.→ 0.
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(a) Our approach (b) Naive approach
Figure 5. Sepsis simulator design sensitivity. Data generation process with level of confounding Γ? = 1.0. Estimated lower and
upper bound of two policies (with and without antibiotics) under (a) our approach with sensitivity 1.7 (b) naive approach with
sensitivity 1.23.
Applying Lemmas 8, 9, we conclude that for any εn ↓ 0, lim infn→∞ dist(θ?, Sεn) p→ 0 conditional on D∞ and E . Now,
note that for any ∆ > 0,
P
(
| lim inf
n→∞ dist(θ
?, Sεn)| ≥ ∆
)
= P
(
| lim inf
n→∞ dist(θ
?, Sεn)| ≥ ∆ | E
)
= E
[
P
(
| lim inf
n→∞ dist(θ
?, Sεn)| ≥ ∆ | D∞, E
)
| E
]
= E
[
P
(
| lim inf
n→∞ dist(θ
?, Sεn)| ≥ ∆ | D∞, E
)]
where the first and the last equality used since P(E) = 1. By dominated convergence, the preceeding display goes to 0 as
n→∞.
D. Experiments
This section provides implementation details for the experiments presented in the main text.
D.1. Sepsis Sim
We use the sepsis simulator developed by Oberst and Sontag (2019).
The optimal policy Recall that we assume that the decisions are made near-optimally. To learn the optimal policy, we
generate 2000 samples for each transition and constructed the transition matrix P (s, a, s′) and the reward matrix R(s, a, s′)
of the MDP. Similar to Oberst and Sontag (2019) we used policy iteration to learn the optimal policy. We create a near-
optimal (soft optimal) policy by having the policy take a random action with probability 0.05, and the optimal action with
probability 0.95. The value function (for the optimal policy) was computed using value iteration. The horizon is T = 5 and
the discount factor γ = 0.99, which results in soft optimal policy having an average value (over the possible distribution of
state states) of 0.14.
Confounding We injected confounding in the first decision of this simulation by defining two different policies: “with
antibiotics” and “without antibiotics”. “with antibiotics” which is identical to the soft optimal policy except that the
probability mass of actions without antibiotics is moved to the corresponding action with antibiotics. For example, if
the probability of the action a1 =(antibiotics on, vasopressors off, ventilation on) in the soft optimal policy is p1, and
a′1 =(antibiotics off, vasopressors off, ventilation on) is p
′
1, then in the “with antibiotics” a1 has probability p1 + p
′
1 and a
′
1
has probability zero in this new policy. The “without antibiotics” does the opposite: moves probability mass of actions with
antibiotics to the corresponding action without antibiotics. In our confounding scenario, for healthy patients we administer
antibiotics (i.e. follow the “with antibiotics”) policy with a higher probability (w.p.
√
Γ
1+
√
Γ
). For unhealthy patients, we
administer antibiotics with a lower probability (w.p. 1
1+
√
Γ
).
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Concretely, to compute the transition from a state conditional on an action, we do inverse transform sampling: we generate a
uniform random variable Ut on [0, 1], and use this to index into the transition probability distribution for the next state, sorted
by the states’ value function and current reward. This coupling ensures that if Ut is large, then the next state will have a high
value, and if Ut is small, then the next state will have a low value. The hidden variable U used for confounding in the first
decision is U =
∑T
t=1 Ut, which serves as a surrogate for the health of patient, because the larger U is, the more likely the
patient is to have improving state values. We choose a threshold u0, and if U > u0, the behavior policy follows the action
with antibiotics, and if U ≤ u0, the behavior policy follows the action without antibiotics, thus introducing confounding.
After the first decision, the behaviour policy is a mixture of two policies: 85% the soft optimal policy and 15% of a
sub-optimal policy that is similar to the soft optimal but the vasopressors action is flipped. For example, if probability of the
action a1 =(antibiotics on, vasopressors off, ventilation on) is p1, and a′1 =(antibiotics on, vasopressors on, ventilation on)
in p′1 in the soft optimal policy, then the sub-optimal has probability p
′
1 and p1 for action a1 and a
′
1, respectively.
Loss minimization Since the state and action space are discrete, we learn the tabular value κ(s, a) for each state action
pair separately to minimize the empirical loss. Additionally, in order to compute the upper bound of both ours and the naive
method, we compute the negative of the lower bound on the negative of return (cost).
Behaviour Policy We estimate the behaviour policies from the data in two parts: the first time step and time steps t = 2
through t = 5. By the assumptions stated above, each of these policies depends only on the previous state, and we learn the
tabular probability of each state action pair pit(a|s) separately.
Design Sensitivity We present another design sensitivity experiment, with Γ
?
= 1.0. Figure 5 (a,b) shows design
sensitivity of our method (1.7) versus the naı¨ve method (1.23).
D.2. Autism
In the autism experiments, our data generation process (simulator) is adopted from Lu et al. (2016, Appendix B). Each indi-
vidual has a set of covariates X , consisting of six mean-centered features: {age, gender, indicator of African
American, indicator of Caucasian, indicator of Hispanic, indicator of Asian}. The Autism
SMART trial (Kasari et al., 2014) simulator specifies a set of 300 individuals: to obtain a sample size N , we sample with
replacement from this set. For details on the simulator, we refer to Appendix B of Lu et al. (2016). At the first timestep there
are two actions available A1 ∈ {−1, 1}, where A1 = 1 denote BLI, and A1 = −1 denote AAC. At the second timestep
there are three actions A2 ∈ {−1, 0, 1}, where A2 = 1 denote assigning intensified BLI to slow responders, A2 = −1
denote assigning AAC to slow responder and A2 = 0 denote continuing with the same action for fast responders.
Confounding The original simulator did not have confounding. We now describe how we introduce confounding in this
setting.
Lu et al. (2016, Appendix B) specifies the effect of the second action (whether to augment BLI with AAC) on the reward
outcome Y as follows:
Y = ηT31X + η22Y0 + η
T
33A1 + η34Y12 − 2θ(1−R)(A1 + 1)A2 + .
A1 is either −1 or 1. Therefore the final term (outside of the noise ) is non-zero only when A1 = 1, and we can interpret θ
as the effect size of the adaptive policy (which always takes A1 = 1); for exact definition of the effect size refer to Lu et al.
(2016). For those more familiar with the RL literature, it is related to the advantage function. In the original paper, Figure 7
in Lu et al. (2016) were generated using 4 different values of θ.
We introduce confounding by varying θ (thereby impacting the potential outcome) and then altering the behavioral treatment
decisions according to the knowledge of that θ. More precisely, given a θ0, for each individual, we randomly set θ0 + σθ or
θ0− σθ. The second action is 1 with probability
√
Γ
1+
√
Γ
if θ ≥ θ0 and 1 with probability 11+√Γ if θ ≤ θ0. In our experiments,
we take σθ = 5.
Loss minimization To estimate κ(Ht? ; at?) in the loss minimization problem, we used a neural network with 3 hidden
layers of size {128, 128, 128, 64} with Relu activations, followed by a single linear output layer. We initialize the
layers with Xavier initialization and used the Adam optimizer with learning rate 10−3. The input Ht is 10-dimensional
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consisting of 6 covariates, indicator of slow responder, initial action A1, number of speech utterances after the initial action,
and an interaction term between A1 and the slow responder indicator.
Behaviour Policy We use logistic regression to estimate the behaviour policy from the observed data: note that this is
not the true behavior policy, because that depends on the (latent) confounding. Different models were fit for the first and
second time steps. For the first timestep the learned model is pi1(A1|H1), where H1 contains the observed X (6 covariates),
and A1 ∈ {−1, 1}. For the estimated behavior policy in the second timestep pi2(A2|H2), H2 includes X (6 covariates),
the action A1, indicator of slow responder, the interaction term between A1 and the indicator, and the number of speech
utterances after the initial action.
